13 MAY 1970

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Confidential



TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential
13 May 1970
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 4 - 10 MAY 1970

Moscow (3374 items)			Peking (3374 items)		
VE Day Czechoslovakia [Liberation Anniversary [Soviet-Czech- oslovak Treaty Renewal	(7%) (3%) (1%) ()	27% 23% 16%] 7%]	Indochina [Cambodia [Summit Conference [Vietnam [Laos Domestic Issues	(40%) (6%) (34%) (0.4%) () (25%)	83% 71%] 8%] 3%] 0.4%]
Indochina [Cambodia China Lenin Centenary	(17%) (11%) (8%) (26%)	22% 19%] 5% 5%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Vietnamese communist media dismiss President Nixon's 8 May press conference as an unsuccessful attempt to cope with the protests of students and others in the United States over the "overt aggression" against Cambodia and the expansion of the Vietnam war to the whole of Indochina. Propagandists continue to obscure the President's statement that the aim of the U.S. and GVN operations is to clear out Vietnamese communist sanctuaries in Cambodia; the allied action is pictured as directed against the Cambodian "patriots." On 11 May the DRV Foreign Ministry protests the naval operation up the Mekong and says Western sources have revealed that "the Saigon puppet administration, on U.S. orders, plans to use its navy to blockade the Cambodian coast ..."

The "Royal National Union Government," announced by Sihanouk on 5 May, has now been recognized by 16 governments, including the PRC and six other communist countries. But only Romania of the USSR's European allies has extended recognition, and Kosygin pointedly fails to mention the new government in a message, carried by Soviet media on the 12th, which greets the "united front of Cambodia," the "united front of the people of Indochina," and the struggle of the "patriotic forces of Cambodia." Peking gives unprecedented publicity to Cambodian developments—70 percent of total comment. More than a quarter of the items on Cambodia concern the new government, and on the 12th NCNA carries a Burmese CP statement which says that the Soviets "have not dared up to now" to recognize it.

High-level Moscow and Peking consultations with the Vietnamese are now publicized with the reports that First Secretary Le Duan had talks with Brezhnev on the 8th and with Chou En-lai on the 11th, the same day Le Duan was received by Mao and Lin Piao. There are continued attacks in Peking propaganda on alleged Soviet "collusion" with the United States, and Moscow continues its propaganda attacks on the PRC for failing to join in "united action" in regard to Indochina. Hanoi takes its consistent public stance in playing up support from both countries. A NHAN DAN editorial on 13 May says statements issued in the USSR, PRC, and other fraternal socialist countries "have laid stress on their resolve to take resclute actions, on the pressing need for strengthening the unity of all socialist, anti-imperialist and peace forces in order to stay the hands of the U.S. imperialist aggressors . . . "

PRESIDENT NIXON'S PRESS CONFERENCE, ANTIWAR DEMONSTRATIONS

HANOI AND THE FRONT VNA observed on 9 May that the President called his press conference at a time when the United States "has entered a political crisis graver than any under the Johnson

Administration" and that the meeting with the press "was intentionally ApprovedifortReleases 2000/08/09 in CIA: BDR85100875R000300030049-2

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Front propaganda on the press conference uniformly includes references to the recent student demonstrations, particularly the death of the four students at Kent University. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 11th sees evidence of an effort by the President to "deplete" the Washington demonstration in his early morning visit with students at the Lincoln Memorial on the 9th, as well as in his earlier invitation to students for "private contacts."

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article repeats a 10 May VNA report of the demonstration in claiming that 200,000 people attended. It adds that many Republican and Democratic congressmen have participated in the "struggle." The article, like a Hanoi radio broadcast on the 10th, says that 250 State Department employees sent a letter to the Secretary—an "unprecedented" occurrence in the Department.

Earlier, Hanoi media had publicized messages to U.S. organizations extending wishes for success of the planned demonstrations. They included messages to the Students Mobilization Committee and Students for a Democratic Society from the Vietnam Students Union, the Committee for Solidarity with the American People, and the Liberation Student Union. A VNA item reports that the Solidarity Committee and Students Union held a meeting in Hanoi on the 8th to protest the U.S. "invasion" of Cambodia and to welcome the U.S. protest movement.

The 9 May VNA report of the President's press conference sees the "anxiety and discontent of broad sections" reflected in the fact that 24 out of 27 questions were about Cambodia and Vietnam, but this and other Vietnamese communist propaganda ignores much of the substance of the press conference. VNA says all the President's efforts and activities since his inauguration have been aimed at winning a military victory and bringing Vietnam and Indochina under U.S. sway. This contention appears in other propaganda, including a 9 May statement by the DRV press spokesman in Paris reported by Hanoi media on the 11th.

The President's remarks on a withdrawal from Cambodia by the end of June are noted disparagingly. The VNA report says that to deal with "embarrassing questions" on a pullout he "had to mention 30 June as a time limit," and it views his remark that some U.S. forces would be withdrawn within a week as "an immediate step to soothe public opinion." VNA also contrasts the President's statements with the reported remark by ARVN 3d corps commander Gen. Do Cao Tri that "the occupation of Cambodia would be indefinite." A Hanoi radio broadcast, also on the 9th, dismisses the promise that U.S. forces would be withdrawn by the end of June with the observation that "indeed U.S. troops would be forced to return to South Vietnam because in July, with the onset of the rainy season, they would be bogged down if they remained."

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The general tone of the comment is typified by the 9 May Hanoi braodcast's claim that the President's explanation of his Indochina policies and his statement that the antiwar protesters' objectives are similar to his own amount to the same "crafty arguments" he used in his 30 April speech and represent "the extreme limit of lying and scorn for public opinion." An LPA Commentator article, carried by Liberation Radio on the 10th, says "Nixon talked nonsense because he had run out of reason" and asks: "Can anyone believe that the U.S. aggressive operations in Cambodia and the American people's antiwar demonstrations have the same objectives?" A NHAN DAN commentary on the 11.th, as summarized by VNA the same day, observes that unlike his 30 April address the President's latest remarks acknowledge the "intensity of the protest movement in the United States." But the paper says "Nixon remains as bellicose and adamant as ever, and because he tried to justify the unjustifiable, his contentions are full of sophisms, lies, and stupidities." VNA also briefly reviews an 11 May QUAN DOT NHAN DAN article which questions the President's rationale for the Cambodian operations -- that the Vietnamization program was threatened. Pointing out that in his 20 April speech announcing another troop withdrawal the President had said the program was progressing, the paper says "Nixon has proved to be the biggest double-crosser, a most pernicious opponent of the righteous demands of the American people."

Hanoi's failure to acknowledge the substance of President Nixon's remarks is illustrated by the radio broadcast on the 9th. It says cryptically that the President claimed that even after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Cambodia, the United States "would pay attention to the future and neutrality of Cambodia and Laos." It then proceeds to cite examples of U.S. "aggression" which give the lie to professions of respect for neutrality, and it totally ignores the context of the exchange—the fact that the President, responding to a question on policy toward Cambodia, observed that it was necessary to use diplomacy regarding the neutrality of small countries which are unable to defend themselves and that the United States is exploring this problem with the USSR, Britain, and the Asian countries which are to meet in Djakarta.

Hanoi also ignored the President's references to pursuing negotiations in forums other than the Paris talks and his statement that he would deliver a report to the nation upon the conclusion of the Cambodian operation. Vietnamese communist comment also failed to note that the Fresident was asked specifically about Paris; however, the PRG Paris spokesman's statement—also made on

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the 9th and carried by communist media on the 11th--did reiterate the line that "it is obvious the Nixon Administration is continuing to prevent all progress at the Paris conference . . . while creating an extremely serious situation in Indochina and Southeast Asia."

Moscow has given the press conference minimal attention.

The initial TASS report on the 9th observes that it was "mainly devoted to the armed intrusion of U.S. troops into neutral Cambodia" and that the President used old arguments in an attempt to "dampen the powerful wave" of protests at home and abroad. TASS says the President supported Secretary Laird's "recent belligerent statement" that the United States may resume bombing of the DRV and warned that "large and more effective forces" may be used against the North, but TASS does not acknowledge that the President made these actions conditional on a DRV troop movement across the DMZ. A radio commentary in English to the United Kingdom on the 9th expresses skepticism about the President's promise that withdrawal from Cambodia will begin next week and be completed by the end of June.

TASS carries numerous reports on the U.S. antiwar demonstrations and notes that Dr. Spock, Mrs. Coretta King, and Senator Brooke were on the speakers' platform at the 9 May rally in Washington. It also takes note of protest by such figures as UAW leader Walter Reuther, Mayor Lindsay, and Yale President Kingman Brewster, as well as the petition to the Secretary of State from Department employees; there is publicity for a message from the Student Councils of the USSR and of various Soviet cities to the National Student Association expressing support for the 9 May Washington demonstration. On the 12th TASS notes the vote in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the amendment to the foreign military sales bill cutting off funds for U.S. forces in Cambodia.

PEKING The only available PRC acknowledgment of President Nixon's press conference comes in an 11 May NCNA report of the antiwar demonstrations. NCNA says the President "hastily held a press conference" on the eve of the Washington rally, again using "deceptive tactics" to appease the anger of the American people.

NCNA carries numerous reports on the demonstrations, mentioning the "mammoth" demonstration of some 100,000 people in Washington and describing rallies at colleges and universities throughout the country. A PEOPLE'S DATLY Commentator article, carried by NCNA on the 9th, scores the Nixon Administration's "persecution" of the American students, pointing to the deaths of the Kent State students and the stationing of "fully armed troops and police" at various universities. The Administration aims its guns at the

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American people as well as the people of Indochina, Commentator says, but he states that such suppression will only intensify the protest movement.

On 7 May NCNA and Peking radio's English-language broadcasts carried a cable from Penn Nouth, Prime Minister of the "Royal Government of National Union," to Senator Mansfield recalling the Senator's past friendship for Cambodia and asking him to use his influence to make the American people understand that they are being "dragged by their President" into a spreading war. The message also thanks Mansfield and his congressional colleagues for their stand against the President's decision.

RECOGNITION OF "ROYAL NATIONAL UNION GOVERNMENT" OF CAMBODIA

Sihanouk's new "Royal National Union Government" to date has been recognized by 16 governments, including seven communist regimes. But the USSR so far has withheld recognition, as have all of its East European allies except Romania.* On 12 May TASS released the undated Kosygin message to Sihanouk which "greets" the formation of "the united front of Cambodia, the strengthening of the united anti-imperialist front of the peoples of Indochina, and also the measures taken to organize the struggle of the patriotic forces of Cambodia against the American aggression." Kosygin fails to mention Sihanouk's titles, addressing him only as "esteemed Samdech."

Paris AFP reports on the 12th that Sihanouk "immediately" answered Kosygin's telegram, thanking him for his support but formally requesting official Soviet recognition of the new government. Communist media are not known thus far to have mentioned Sihanouk's response, but NCNA publicizes a "special message" from Sihanouk to the Cambodian liberation armed forces on the 12th in which he notes that a "great number" of countries have already broken with the Lon Nol regime and adds that "in the future only the countries subservient to or friendly with the United States will maintain or establish their embassies in Phnom Penh."

^{*} The other communist countries are the PRC, DRV, Albania, Cuba, North Korea, and Yugoslavia, as well as South Vietnam's PRG. Noncommunist countries known to have extended recognition are Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Congo (B), Mauritania, South Yemen, Sudan, and the UAR.

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Also on the 12th, NCNA carries a 10 May statement by the Burmese Communist Party, scoring U.S. "aggression" in Cambodia, which includes an attack on the Soviets: the "Soviet revisionist clique, though compelled to issue a statement containing pretentious denunciation, dares not denounce the counterrevolutionary Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique by name, and has not dared up to now to recognize the Royal Government of National Union."

PEKING AND Peking seized on Belgrade's condemnation of the U.S. Cambodian action and prompt recognition of the BELGRADE Sihanouk government on 6 May, the day after its formation was announced. On the 8th NCNA carried a Belgrade-datelined item--highly unusual for Peking--publicizing Tito's message to Sihanouk and citing BORBA for an account of the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council session which decided to recognize the Sihanouk government-in-exile. The same item summarized an Executive Council communique condemning "U.S. open military intervention in Cambodia and the resumption of bombing of the DRV." Yugoslavia's reaction to the U.S. actions has been notably vehement, with Tito denouncing the American move in two speeches, seconded by other leading figures and by articles in BORBA and other Yugoslav media. TANYUG has recounted angry popular protests.

The PRC is the only country thus far to have accepted an DIPLOMATIC ambassador from the government-in-exile, NCNA reporting PERSONNEL on 9 May that the PRC Government had agreed to the appointment of Ker Meas. On the 9th NCNA scored the Phnom Penh authorities for holding Chinese diplomatic personnel "hostages" until the return home from Peking of the Cambodian diplomats representing Lon Nol's government. Pyongyang's KCNA carried an "authorized statement" on the same day denouncing Phnom Penh for similarly holding North Korea's diplomats.

Hanoi media on the 13th carried a DRV Foreign Ministry statement recalling that on 25 March the DRV Government had decided to "stop" the activities of the DRV Embassy and commercial representation and to bring home all personnel except for a number to guard the property. The statement says the DRV has now decided that the stay of the latter personnel "is no longer necessary" and asks Phnom Penh to permit their departure. A similar PRG Foreign Ministry statement was carried by Liberation Radio on the same day.

FIRST SECRETARY LE DUAN REPORTED IN POLAND, USSR, PRC

Warsaw's PAP reported on 6 May that VWP First Secretary Le Duan left Poland that day "after a rest of several days." The news agency added that he had talks with First Secretary Gomulka and other Polish

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leaders "in a cordial and fraternal atmosphere." TASS quoted the PAP report some four hours later on the 6th.*

This was the first known reference in communist media to Le Duan's whereabouts since Prague's CTK--as well as Western news agencies--reported on 30 April that he had left Moscow the day before for Peking. Le Duan had arrived in Moscow on 18 April at the head of the DRV delegation to the Lenin anniversary observances.

On 8 May TASS reported that Brezhnev received Le Duan in Moscow for talks on "questions connected with the intensification of the U.S. imperialist aggression against the peoples of Indochina" and about "some measures to strengthen further friendship and cocperation" between the two countries. TASS said the conversation took place in an atmosphere of "brotherhood and cordiality." VNA carried a similar report on the 9th, and on the same day TASS briefly reported that Le Duan had "left Moscow for home."

On 10 May NCNA reported Le Duan's arrival that day in Peking for "a visit to China." The next day NCNA said that he was received by Chou En-lai for cordial and friendly talks" and that on the same day he was accorded the honor of being received by Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao. NCNA noted on 12 May that Sihanouk had a "cordial and friendly" meeting with Le Duan that day, and later on the 12th NCNA said Le Duan had left for home "after concluding his visit to China." VNA has reported the meetings with Chou, Mao and Lin, and Sihanouk.

ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL, ASIAN CONFERENCES ON INDOCHINA

Some inconsistency on the issue of an international conference is displayed in Moscow propaganda following Kosygin's 4 May press conference remark that the "decisive word" rests with Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos but that now seems the time not for meetings but for actions to stop U.S. "aggression." TASS reported promptly on 6 May that Secretary General U Thant had made a statement on Indochina the day before. TASS noted that Thant "urged the use of

^{*} A message from VNA's home office in Hanoi to the Moscow office on 9 May asked for a report on Le Duan's visit to Poland. A reply from VNA Moscow the same day said that there had been no public announcement when the delegation visited Poland but that there was authorization now to publicize the fact of the visit. On the 11th Moscow VNA sent the Hanoi office a more detailed report of the visit with the caveat "check the following report before releasing it."

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all means to settle the Vietnam problem by peaceful talks," but it neglected to mention that he spoke of the French proposal on broad negotiations. PRAVDA published the brief TASS report in full, but an IZVESTIYA item noted only that U Thant expressed "profound concern" over the U.S. escalation in Indochina and said nothing about talks of any kind.

TASS on the 7th, reporting remarks by Polish Foreign Minister Jedrychowski at a luncheon given by the French Diplomatic Press Association in Paris, quoted him as saying Poland would not object to an enlarged conference on Indochina as proposed by France "provided a majority of countries agreed." Bulgaria is the only other communist source known to have reported Jedrychowski's comments on a new conference. Moscow papers have carried no report of his remarks in Paris. The Warsaw PAP account of the foreign minister's remarks does not mention an enlarged conference, and an account published in ZYCIE WARSZAWY on the 7th says only that "both countries are profoundly disturbed by the dangerous development of the conflict in Indochina and wish to do their best to restore peace there as soon as possible."

On 11 May Soviet media commented negatively on the British stand on a Geneva conference. A TASS commentary, attacking the British Government's failure to censure the U.S. intrusion into Cambodia, says that Britain "insists on its proposal to convene a new international conference on Indochina and to resume the activity of the neutral group of observers in Laos and Cambodia." TASS calls it "ludicrous" to propose the convening of a new conference after the United States has "arrogantly violated" the 1954 Geneva agreement which serves as the basis for Cambodia's status. A Moscow commentary broadcast in English to North America the same day says that the British Government, a Geneva conference cochairman, has tried to "camouflage" its support of the United States by suggesting another Geneva conference on Indochina. It remarks that at a time when Cambodia is "occupied" by U.S. and Saigon troops, "such a conference would merely be a screen for future violations of the already existing Geneva agreements."

Another critical reference to Soviet UN representative Yakov Malik appears currently in Peking propaganda. NCNA on the 13th carries a statement by the Thai CP on Cambodia which denounces Malik's statement on a Geneva conference as an effort to "legalize" the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak "clique."

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DRV ON DRV media promptly scored Secretary General U Thant's remarks U THANT on an Indochina conference, with Hano: radio on 8 May taking him to task for failing to criticize the U.S. "imperialists" and instead expressing concern about the "recent situation in Indochina." The broadcast said Thant's call for "urgent negotiations among all parties in Indochina" was consistent with a U.S. scheme aimed at legalizing the Lon Nol regime, and it noted that Secretary Rogers had immediately endorsed U Thant's remarks.

that Secretary Rogers had immediately endorsed U Thant's remarks. Hanoi recalled that the declaration issued by the 24-25 April Indochina summit conference had "strongly condemned all schemes of the United States and its hirelings as well as Asian reactionaries to take advantage of the United Nations or any international or Asian organization or conference to legalize" the Lon Nol regime. VNA commented along the same lines on the 9th and expressed support for Sihanouk's 5 May statement that "no one has any right to convene any international conference on the question of Cambodia."

DJAKARTA

A Moscow broadcast in English to Southeast Asia on 6 May, commenting on the proposal for an Asian and Pacific countries' conference on Cambodia, reported that seven out of 21 countries had rejected Djakarta's invitation but proceeded to list only six—the DPRK, the DRV, India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon. A Djakarta broadcast on 1 May reported Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik as stating that the PRC had officially declined his invitation, but available Peking propaganda has not mentioned the invitation.

MOSCOW CONTINUES CRITICISM OF CHINESE POSITION

In the wake of Kosygin's statement on 4 May that the escalation of U.S. "aggression" makes "even more urgent the need for uniting and strengthening the cohesion of all the socialist, anti-imperialist, and peace-loving forces," routine Soviet propaganda directed to the PRC has continued to stress the theme of united action. The day after a 5 May Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin recalled various past proposals on united action, another one recalled that joint actions of the USSR and the PRC in the past had dealt blows to the "imperialists" and cited the example of the resolution of the Indochina question at the 1954 Geneva conference. Moscow propaganda periodically cites the example of Sino-Soviet cooperation at the Geneva conference, the most recent previous case being in a 26 April Radio Moscow broadcast in Mandarin.

^{*} See the 6 May TRENDS, page 11, for background on this commentary.

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A Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on 9 May scored the Chinese for opening an "unprecedented" anti-Soviet campaign at a time when "all the peace-loving nations are faced with the solemn and pressing question of how to adopt united actions to counter the aggressors" in Indochina. The commentary says that at the end of April the Chinese stepped up their campaign, thus leading Washington to believe that "Peking's hands were tied in the north" and encouraging the Americans to expand aggression in Southeast Asia. Comparing this with the period of the inception of the bombing of the DRV, the commentary repeats the recurrent allegation that Mao Tse-tung assured the American writer Edgar Snow that China would not go to war if Chinese territory were left alone. Recalling that at that time the Chinese rejected proposals on united actions, the commentary remarks that the "situation is roughly similar today." While "the need is greater than ever" for all anti-imperialist forces to act in unison. it says, the Chinese leaders stubbornly disseminate the idea that China is in danger of being invaded from the north.

A 12 May Peace and Progress commentary in Mandarin quotes Kosygin's greetings message of that date to Sihanouk and reiterates that the escalation of U.S. aggression in Indochina makes more urgent the need for uniting and strengthening socialist cohesion. It recalls that U.S. actions in Indochina were denounced in the 7 May Soviet-Czechoslovak communique as well as by Brezhnev in Prague on the 7th and that the communique also denounced Peking for pursuing a splittist, anti-Soviet policy. The commentary repeats the charge that the Chinese encouraged U.S. escalation by their anti-Soviet policy and mentions the "scoundrelly" PEOPLE'S DAILY article of 22 April which "was in reality Mao Tse-tung's invitation to the United States to begin the invasion of Cambodia."*

MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

ALLIED MOVES A Hanoi radio report on the 9th takes note of the launching across the Cambodian frontier the preceding day of a combined U.S.-South Vietnamese naval force up the Mekong River and predictably calls it a "new aggressive attack against Cambodia." Earlier Vietnamese communist comment had largely ignored the location of the military operations in the "Parrot's Beak" area of Svay Rieng Province and the "Fishhook" area of

^{*} The TRENDS of 22 April, page 23, discusses the 22 April joint editorial article in PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY on the occasion of the Lenin centenary, which scathingly attacked the Brezhnev leadership.

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Kompong Cham Province. But Hanoi now notes the allied thrusts into Svay Rieng, Kompong Cham, Kratie, Mondolkiri, and Ratanakiri provinces in asserting that the naval "attack" in the direction of Phnom Penh has "unmasked" President Nixon's statement that U.S. forces have not moved beyond 30 kilometers inside Cambodia.

Both an LPA dispatch and a NHAN DAN article of the 9th comment on the Mekong expedition, LPA saying that the "alleged" purpose is to assist interned Vietnamese residents in Cambodia but that in fact the naval armada is "ferrying armaments" to the Phnom Penh authorities and carrying out the "vicious scheme" of "forcibly" repatriating Vietnamese residents to GVN-controlled areas of South Vietnam. NHAN DAN also takes note of the arrival in Cambodia of "thousands" of native Cambodian "mercenary troops" from South Vietnam and a reportedly "secret" visit to Phnom Penh by Vice President Ky to discuss with government leaders further repressive plans against the Khmer people and Vietnamese residents.

The allied naval expedition also prompts a DRV Foreign Ministry statement of the 11th, carried by VNA the same day. The statement condemns "this extremely impudent aggressive act," repeats the DRV's denunciation of the "massive aggressive operations in the eastern provinces of Cambodia from Ratanakiri to Svay Rieng," and takes note of Western reports that the GVN intends to use naval forces to blockade the Cambodian coast and "land troops at Ream and Kompong Som." The DRV Foreign Ministry demands an "immediate end" to these actions and routinely says that the United States, Saigon, and Phnom Penh "must bear full responsibility for all the consequences arising from their acts."

STATEMENT BY The first statement uted to the "command" of the "Cambodian Peo, Liberation Armed CAMBODIAN PLAF Forces" (PLAF), dated 3 May, was carried by VNA on the 11th. VNA said it was released by the "Information Bureau of the National United Front of Kampuchea" (FUNK), an organization which had been mentioned as early as 7 May in a report of military developments. The PLAF statement contains a call by the command to its forces throughout Cambodia to 1) quickly develop the three categories of armed forces, 2) attack enemy troops of all kinds, be they government, Khmer Serei, U.S., or Saigon forces, 3) carry out political agitation among enemy troops, and 4) closely unite with the Vietnamese and Chinese residents. The statement also expresses the Cambodian PLAF's conviction that "our Khmer people and armed forces will certainly attain our immediate fighting objectives."

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The statement claims that the PLAF has "repeatedly attacked the enemy and liberated hundreds of hamlets and villages and dozens of subsectors and district towns together with tens of thousands of people . . . and built up FUNK committees of various levels in the newly liberated areas." Similar general references to the establishment of popular administration had appeared in a 6 May Hanoi radio commentary and in a VNA report on the 7th. Some reports in mid-April specified that provisional committees had been set up in areas of Kompong Cham and Svay Rieng provinces.

SIHANOUK Sihanouk's 12 May message to the armed forces mentions the CLAIMS creation of people's administrations "in many provinces and districts, particularly in Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, Kandal, Kompong Cham, Kompong Sepu, Takeo, Kampot, Mondolkiri, Ratanakiri, Kratie, and Stung Treng provinces."

Sihanouk's 12 May message does not repeat his 25 April reference to "Indochinese people's liberation forces" and repeatedly refers to military activity waged by "our liberation army" or "our people's army." In briefly tracing the chronology of developments in Cambodia leading up to the American decision to move "against our people," NCNA reports Sihanouk as saying that "our people's army had already surrounded Phnom Penh and was on the point of taking the capital by assault" before the allied military moves were made. Earlier, NCNA's 11 May report of a Royal Government statement proclaiming the severance of diplomatic relations with the United States asserted that had it not been for U.S. intervention the FUNK's armed forces "would have been in Phnom Penh by now."

Sihanouk's message also contains a brief account of military victories allegedly achieved by the liberation forces, including "the capture of the cities of Kratie, Senmonorom, Stung Treng, Chhouk, etc. . . ., the cutting off of the communication, telegraphic and telephone lines between more than 20 urban centers and Phnom Penh." (The ellipses are NCNA's.) In the meantime, the message adds, "in 13 provinces, including Battambang, a large part of the population has been freed from the control of the Lon Nol administration."

FUNK OFFICIALS VNA on the 9th and NCNA on the 11th carried a second IN CAMBODIA statement, dated 1 May, from the same three former Cambodian deputies who authored a statement dated 26 March, released by VNA on 10 April.* The three former deputies—Khieu Sam Phon, Hou Youn, and Hu Nim—are Political Bureau members of

^{*} See the 15 April TRENDS, page 6, for an account of the earlier statement, which expressed support for Sihanouk's 23 March appeal.

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the FUNK's Central Committee and, respectively Minister of National Defense, Minister of In ormation, and Minister of Interior in Sihanouk's self-proclaimed "Royal Government of National Union." In addition, VNA now identifies them as "representatives of the Cambodian People's Movement of United Resistance affiliated with the FUNK." This is the first time the propaganda has mentioned such an organization. The new statement, "on behalf of the members of the Cambodian People's Movement of United Resistance," sets out general tasks for all Cambodians, the "FUNK committees at various levels in the country," and the liberation forces.

NCNA on 11 May reported Sihanouk as having said, during a reception hosted in Peking the same day for friendly diplomats, that the three authors of the statement "are in their home country leading the Cambodian people to carry out heroic struggles." And Sihanouk says in his 12 May message that he has entrusted the management of Cambodia "entirely to the patriotic persons who are now leading the national resistance in the country, particularly Comrades Khieu Sam Phon, Hou Youn and Hu Nim."

STATEMENT BY
"PEOPLE'S GROUP"

The Cambodian CP-front organization called the
"People's Group" (Pracheachon) resurfaced when its
Central Committee statement, dated 23 April, was
carried by VNA on 3 May and subsequently publicized by Front and Chinese
media. Expressing support for Sihanouk's 23 March appeal, the statement
says that "over the past 15 years (1955-70)" the People's Group, under
"difficult as well as favorable circumstances," has consistently and
actively carried out its political stand of uniting "patriotic"
Cambodians—including "patriotic members of the royal family"—in
the struggle against U.S. imperialism.

The People's Group was announced on 6 August 1955 when VNA summarized a statement saying that it had been established in July in accordance with the Cambodian national constitution and that it was made up of "former members of the Khmer resistance." The People's Group ran candidates under its own label in the 1955 and 1958 Cambodian elections. It was suppressed by Sihanouk in the early 1960's.

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SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS Vietnamese communist reports on military action in the first week of May include several items hailing the attacks on Chu

Lai, Quang Nam Province, and attacks on bases along the Cambodian border said to have been used to launch allied actions in Cambodia. A Hanoi radio commentary of the 9th says that these early May "victories" are strong encouragement for the Khmers.

A PLAF command instruction, broadcast by the Front on the 10th, urges combatants to accelerate their emulation in fighting to defeat the allies and thus commemorate the historic days in May: Ho's birthday, the anniversary of the PRG, the recent founding of the 'Indochinese people's front," and the anniversary of Dien Bien Phu. The instruction, dated 7 May, hails the "victories" of the communists in April, routinely calling them a violent blow to Vietnamization and to U.S. expansion of the war, and proof of solidarity among the Indochinese people. It sets forth several tasks for the PLAF: developing the offensive and annihilating allied troops and destroying their materiel, aiding the people in their uprisings, and striving for "thrift" and for boosting production.

PEOPLE'S UPRISING, REVOLUTIONARY ORGANS

An undated QUAN GIAI PHONG commentary, broadcast by the Front on the 7th, claims that in the early days of April people's

uprisings occurred vigorously along with the military offensive. The commentary describes a variety of actions throughout the South including demonstrations, punishing allied "agents," and military attacks. It claims that certain localities which used to struggle in legal and overt ways now have "arisen to annihilate tyrants" and take part in military action. This upsurge of uprisings demonstrates that "our political strength is tremendous" and the political position of the "revolution" is enhanced even in allied-controlled areas.

On the 9th the Front radio reports a conference held by Ben Tre Province on 24 April to discuss plans for stepping up activities of the revolutionary administration and consolidating and supporting its organizational apparatus. Representatives of the various echelons of the "administration" were reportedly present.

A people's revolutionary court in a Can Tho district held a public session on 20 April to try two "U.S. spies," Nguyen Van Hai and Tran Van Ba, according to a Front broadcast on the 8th. The broadcast reports that Hai was sentenced to death because he had been an informer and refused to be "educated" or warned about his "crimes."

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COMMENT ON GVN

The recent disturbances at the progovernment Buddhist temple in Saigon prompt communist propaganda attacks on the GVN. Antigovernment ts reportedly seized the temple; progovernment

youths and Buddhists reportedly seized the temple; progovernment Buddhists recaptured it early on the 5th. The communists charge that the latter group of Buddhists was composed of disguised GVN police, and a Front radio broadcast on the 9th ridicules GVN denials of involvement.

On the 7th LPA notes that GVN's action in closing all Saigon schools beginning 5 May and increasing curfew hours. The item calls these moves further steps in repressing the students, and adds that "Saigon is now in a very tense situation." Several items report other incidents, including student demonstrations at the Cambodian embassy and protests against massacres of Vietnamese in Cambodia.

A Front radio commentary on the 12th asserts that in another "fascist, repressive, and terrorist action" by the Saigon regime, the GVN supreme court on 11 May decided to put three student leaders on trial before a military court. Available communist propaganda has not acknowledged the supreme court ruling that Tran Ngoc Chau should be released from prison or its decision declaring invalid the military court trials of arrested students.

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN ON U.S. ENCROACHMENTS

Hanoi radio on 13 May broadcasts a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest condemning alleged U.S. artillery shelling on 11 May against Vinh Hoa village from the southern side of the demilitarized zone. It adds that at the same time U.S.aircraft fired rockets at Vinh Gia village. It asserts that both villages are located on the northern side of the DMZ. The protest routinely condemns the alleged acts and demands an immediate end to "every act of encroachment" on DRV sovereignty and security.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW, PEKING PLAY DOWN DISPUTE, MANEUVER ON INDOCHINA

In a setting dominated by Indochinese developments, Moscow and Peking have played down their polemic on bilateral issues while maneuvering to strengthen their respective positions vis-a-vis the parties involved in Indochina.* Public statements and propaganda surrounding Le Duan's visits to Moscow and Peking have included no reference to the state of Sino-Soviet relations. Last October DRV Premier Pham Van Dong, on the return leg of his visit to the PRC winding up a tour that included the USSR and the GDR, had endorsed the recently opened Sino-Soviet talks and expressed "deep hope" that they would succeed.** NCNA noted at that time that Dong had arrived in Peking after visiting the Soviet Union and the GDR; this time NCNA's 10 Mey announcement of Le Duan's arrival did not mention his previous whereabouts.

Minimal comment on China in Moscow's central media consists essentially of ideological attacks and avoids the previously emphasized theme of provocative Chinese war preparations and anti-Soviet hysteria. The border talks were the subject of a 6 May Moscow broadcast in Mandarin to southeast Asia, elaborating on Kosygin's 4 May press conference remarks on the talks, which went beyond Kosygin in charging that the Chinese have obstructed the restoration of good relations by launching an anti-Soviet campaign. Observing that within the past year Moscow on several occasions has proposed the normalization of relations, the broadcast said the Soviets had advanced "concrete proposals" to this end--possibly an allusion to such proposals as an exchange of ambassadors.

There has been no announcement on the border talks, with chief Soviet negotiator Kuznetsov's trip to Moscow unreported by either side. The head of the PRC delegation at the talks, Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, attended a Czechoslovak embassy reception on 9 May, according to NCNA.

^{*} See the Indochina section of this TRENDS for documentation of Soviet and Chinese propaganda on Cambodia.

^{**} An appeal for fraternal unity reminiscent of statements by Hanoi last fall is contained in a speech delivered by the Italian CP's Berlinguer on 3 May. Calling for solidarity among the Soviet Union, the PRC, and other socialist countries on the Indochina conflict, Berlinguer recalled the appeal in Ho Chi Minh's testament for an end to fraternal strife.

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GRECHKO SPEECH Moscow's current restraint on the China question is reflected in Defense Minister Grechko's 8 May speech marking the 25th anniversary of Nazi Germany's defeat. In contrast to his attack in an article on the occasion last year on the "adventurist" line of the "Mao Tse-tung group," Grechko this time did not mention the Chinese by name. But while respecting current political considerations, he served notice that the Soviets regard China as a source of major concern and have not lowered their guard. Demanding heightened vigilance toward both "imperialist and other militarist [read: Chinese] forces," he warned that Moscow has drawn "the most serious conclusions from the alteration in the military-political situation in the Far East"--that is, the Sino-Soviet confrontation. He added that the Soviets are undertaking all necessary measures to insure that their defense "in both West and East is strong and indestructible."

CZECHOSLOVAKIA The sensitive subject of Czechoslovakia has again figured in Sino-Soviet polemical crossfire. The 7 May joint communique on the Brezhnev-Kosygin delegation's visit to Czechoslovakia took the opportunity to register the two sides' "unanimous" views on Peking's policies in the communist movement and denounced the Chinese for interfering in the internal affairs of the socialist countries. Moscow has sought to drive the point home in broadcasts to China censuring the Maoist leadership for its divisive approach and its inflammatory propaganda urging the Czechoslovaks to resist their leaders and their Soviet overlords.

Peking has provided a reminder of its effort to probe Soviet vulnerabilities in Eastern Europe by sending a message to the Czechoslovak Government on the occasion of Czechoslovakia's national day. The message pointedly hails the Czechoslovaks as a people with "a glorious revolutionary tradition." An NCNA dispatch on 8 May, rounding up worldwide activities marking May Day, directed a barb at the Soviets in taking note of a Swedish demonstration against the U.S. invasion of Cambodia and the "Soviet revisionist military occupation of Czechoslovakia."

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YUGOSLAVIA

BELGRADE USES CAMBODIA ISSUE TO PRESS NONALINEMENT

Belgrade has used the U.S. "invasion" of "nonalined" Cambodia to give impetus to the projected third nonalined summit, scheduled to be held in the Zambian capital of Lusaka in the first half of September. Addressing a Belgrade luncheon for visiting Zambian President Kaunda on 7 May, Tito asserted, according to TANJUG, that "it is high time indeed for all democratic and peaceful forces to oppose the most resolute resistance to the policy of force and to eliminate it from international relations." He went on to condemn "the brutal violation of Cambodia's sovereignty" as "a challenge to all mankind striving for peace." The communique on the two leaders' talks, released by TANJUG on the 6th, contained a condemnation of the U.S. action and emphasized that nonalinement "is the only alternative to the policy of pressure and force and as a road leading toward progress and peace." Tito had made a point of Cambodia's nonalinement in a 3 May speech assailing U.S. "aggression" against that country.

Tito's close associate Kardelj, currently on a tour of Latin America apparently designed in part to drum up support for the Lusaka summit, used the occasion of an airport reception in Santiago, Chile, on 10 May to call on all "peace-seeking forces" to raise their voices in opposition to the U.S. action. TANJUG quoted Kardelj as declaring that "acquiescence in U.S. aggression jeopardizes the independence and sovereignty of every country, for the plight in which Cambodia finds itself may be the fate of other people tomorrow."

Yugoslavia's prompt recognition of the Sihanouk government-in-exile on 6 May, the day after its formation was announced, would also appear to have some relevance to the forthcoming Lusaka summit, where the question of accreditation of a Cambodian delegation may be expected to be an issue. At the Dar es Salaam preparatory meeting held 13-17 April, neither the Sihanouk delegation nor the Lon Nol regime's representation was allowed to take part. A decision on whether or not to seat the Vietnam PRG delegation must also be made at the Lusaka summit.

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW ASSAILS ISRAEL FOR INCURSION INTO LEBANON

Moscow promptly denounces Israel for increasing tension in the Middle East by its 12-13 April raid into southern Lebanon, taking the line that Washington and Tel Aviv are trying to detach Lebanon from the "common Arab front" and isolate it from the rest of the Arab world. According to Shragin in a domestic service commentary on the 12th, Israel and the United States thus want to use Lebanon as a base for action against the UAR and other "progressive" Arab countries.

Shragin and other propagandists link the incursion with reported U.S. plans to reconsider its program of arms supplies to Israel. Vasilyev says in RED STAR on the 13th, according to TASS, that President Nixon's "recent statement on U.S. readiness to reconsider additional deliveries of aircraft to Israel came as a 'stimulant'" for Israel's attack on Lebanon. TASS on the 9th, reporting the President's press conference the previous day, noted that he "confirmed the old policy of supporting the Israeli aggressors and stated that the United States may review the question of selling new consignments of combat planes to Israel." Moscow gave the President's statement no further attention in its very meager broadcast propaganda on the Middle East over the past week.

In the first comment on the new Israeli action, TASS commentator Orlov on the 12th broaches the arms delivery question along the lines of Moscow's recent evasive propaganda response to Israel's charge that Soviet pilots were taking part in operational missions in Egypt. Concurrently with the attack on Lebanon and continuing air strikes on other Arab countries, Orlov says, "imperialist and Zionist" circles are waging a propaganda campaign based on allegations about Arab threats against Israel, using them as a "false pretext" for U.S. reexamination of the arms deliveries.

An Arabic-language commentary on the 12th also finds the timing of the Israeli action "significant" in that it coincides with "flimsy hints" in the U.S. press regarding Washington's "readiness to increase militar and material aid to Tel Aviv." This commentary claims that the Lited States and Israel are concerned with the Lebanese progressive forces' success in consolidating solidarity with the Palestinian resistance movement, "which is of significance" in the Arab struggle for liberation of the occupied territories. The broadcast suggests that Israel suffered such "intense retaliation" on the Egyptian front that it was forced to select other targets,

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possibly considering Lebanon the least dangerous. But it is dangerous for Israel, the broadcast adds, to "rely on the weakness of a particular Arab country" in view of the Arabs' growing solidarity, which has been "brilliantly manifested" in the current attack.

Reporting the Security Council's unanimous adoption on the 12th of a resolution demanding immediate Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory, TASS says that the U.S. and British representatives tried to delay the voting "in the interests of the Israeli aggressors" but that a U.S.-proposed amendment was rejected. TASS makes no mention of the Soviet sub-amendment or of any remarks by Soviet delegate Malik. Reporting the Council's evening session of the 12th, TASS the following day states that Israeli delegate Tekoah "impudently" said Israel had not yet carried out the resolution on withdrawal and that he "boasted of the destruction and casualties" caused by Israeli troops.

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EAST - WEST RELATIONS

GRECHKO ATTACKS "IMPERIALISTS," AFFIRMS SOVIET "PEACE" POLICY

Soviet Defense Minister Grechko's 8 May keynote speech on the 25th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany balances reaffirmations of Soviet adherence to a policy of peaceful coexistence with warnings about a continuing "imperialist" threat, predictable for the occasion. Grechko calls "American imperialism" the "chief bulwark of international reaction," pointing to the United States' accumulation of large stocks of nuclear-missile arms, its support for Israeli "aggression," and its efforts to "implement armed intervention against revolutionary Cuba" as well as its actions in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Both Kosygin and Brezhnev in speeches in Prague on 6 and 7 May, respectively, had decried U.S. actions in Southeast Asia, including the incursions into Cambodia. Kosygin said the U.S. operations in Cambodia compel the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries to do "everything possible to repulse and halt imperialist aggression."

Grechko underscores the adequacy of the defenses of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, at one point noting that the imperialists have been "forced to admit" that a direct clash with the socialist system, particuarly in a nuclear-rocket war, "must lead to disastrous consequences for the capitalist system." A third world war, Grechko says, would "compel mankind to suffer unprecedented trials, [but] it would inevitably lead to the collapse of imperialism as a world system." He stops short of declaring, however, that the socialist system would in fact be the "victor."*

Grechko goes on to state that "a new war is by no means a necessary prerequisite for the universal victory of socialism" and that war can be averted by the united actions of the peace-loving forces—a theme also sounded by Marshal Bagramyan in a talk broadcast by Radio Moscow for foreign audiences on 9 May. Bagramyan called for unity in the struggle against war "in a time of lethal weapons of gigantic destructive capacity" and added that "in our time, war is no longer a fatal inevitability."

^{*} One of the infrequent Soviet references to socialist victory had appeared in a 30 August 1969 SOVIET RUSSIA article by Marshal Krylov, pegged to the anniversary of the outbreak of World War II. Krylov said "victory" in a nuclear war "will be on the side of world socialism and all progressive mankind."

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Grechko declares that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are pursuing "a Leninist policy of peace and friendship" and that their foreign political activities are permeated with a concern for improving the political climate in the world, "first and foremost in Europe." The policy is also directed, he says, at discontinuation "of the strategic and all other kinds of arms races," at establishing a reliable system of collective security, and at eliminating without delay the hotbeds of war in Southeast Asia and the Near East, "for which imperialist powers are to blame." He remarks further that the socialist countries, "following the principles of peaceful coexistence, . . . do not doubt the expediency of this or that concrete agreement with capitalist states, the possibility and necessity of settling unsolved problems by means of diplomacy." Cooperation between countries with different social systems, he concludes, "can be utilized in solving a whole series of questions which are of interest both to the socialist and capitalist states" of the world.

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WEST GERMANY

STOPH TO ATTEND KASSEL SUMMIT DESPITE FRG'S "DISCRIMINATION"

GDR propaganda and leaders' statements indicate that Premier Stoph will attend the second summit meeting with FRG Chancellor Brandt, scheduled to be held at Kassel on 21 May, notwithstanding numerous GDR protests against West German "discrimination" against the East Germans and increasingly personal attacks on Brandt. There is no evidence of any change in the GDR's basic demand presented at the 19 March Erfurt summit: international recognition of the GDR. This position is restated in numerous commentaries and statements, including an exchange of letters between Stoph and Brandt, leaders' speeches and comments surrounding the 25th Victory Day anniversary, and GDR protests arising from West German efforts to prevent GDR admission to membership in the World Health Organization (WHO) at its Geneva assembly that opened 5 May.

KASSEL TALKS Ulbricht personally confirmed that the GDR will not back out of the second summit at Kassel, declaring in a 7 May speech to a Berlin teachers' congress that "we are eager to hear the arguments" Brandt will present to Stoph at Kassel. Restating the GDR's established line and noting that its draft treaty has been in Bonn's hands "for a long time," Ulbricht declared that the second summit would prove whether the FRG Government "is willing at long last" to accept the GDR as an equal and recognize it and accede to other GDR proposals.

GDR media continue to report the activities of GDR officials negotiating on "technical protocol prerequisites" in Bonn and Kassel, as they had done prior to the meeting in Erfurt, and ADN notes on 12 May that GDR officials expect to make one more visit to Kassel before the summit takes place.

STOPH-BRANDT CORRESPONDENCE

Late on 6 May, GDR media publicized Stoph's 5 May letter to Brandt expressing concern about "necessary conditions to insure equal negotiations without any discrimination." Couched in relatively nonpolemical terms, Stoph's letter explained that his doubt that essential conditions for the Kassel summit existed stemmed from the continued existence of the so-called "handcuff law" treating GDR citizens as subject to FRG laws and the fact that a West German "fascist" had filed a charge--Stoph did not acknowledge that it was a murder charge--which was "treated provocatively" by FRG judicial authorities. Stoph also protested FRG efforts to prevent GDR admission to the recent session

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of the UN Economic Commission for Europe and to membership in WHO,

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concluding that the "contradictions" between Brandt's Erfurt declarations and the actual policy of the FRG "are not conducive to promoting the consultations in Kassel."

Stoph said the GDR stresses that all FRG laws infringing on "elementary principles of equality and nondiscrimination" must be eliminated. And he expressed "hope" for "a binding assurance" from West Germany that the GDR delegation will enjoy in Kassel all the "rights, privileges, and immunities" granted "equal-ranking representatives of other sovereign states" in accord with international law.

Brandt's 6 May reply, according to ADN on the 7th, "merely gives the assurance" that Stoph and his party will get the same treatment Brandt had received at Erfurt, ignoring the GDR's demand for rights due heads of "other sovereign states." ADN also says Brandt's reply "defended" discriminatory FRG laws, "expressly affirmed" the FRG's intentions to continue a discriminatory policy and "blatant interference" in GDR affairs, and "arrogantly" mad. It clear that the FRG would not change its policy until the GDR submits to its "revanchist demands." This "blackmail concept utterly contradicts" FRG declarations and international law, ADN complains.

GDR ATTACK

GDR media have contrasted the Victory Day anniversary speeches by GDR leaders with an 8 May Bundestag statement by Brandt on the same occasion. As quoted by ADN on the 10th, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND accused Brandt of failing to "dissociate himself from those responsible" for World War II, of "covering up the crimes of German imperialism before and after 8 May 1945," and of "glossing over present-day war crimes—the U.S. attack on neutral Cambodia." ADN also reports that BERLINER ZEITUNG called Brandt's speech one of "revanchism and nationalism" and charged that Brandt's "embrace" of former Chancellor Adenauer's policies was "tantamount to revanchism."

Stoph's own Victory Day speech at Berlin ceremonies, broadcast by the East Berlin radio on the 8th, covers familiar ground in praising the Soviet role in crushing Hitlerite fascism, tracing the GDR's development as a peace-loving state that has eliminated "imperialism and militarism forever," and impugning FRG intentions. Stoph does not attack Brandt by name, but refers to statements by "leading politicians in Bonn" who, Stoph charges, still seek to camouflage an old policy aimed at "revenge and conquest" with statements lacking the substance of a "truly new policy."

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GDR PROTESTS ON WHO ADMISSION

The GDR protests West German attempts to prevent GDR admission to the World Health Organization in a delegation statement issued on 8 May at the

Geneva World Health Assembly and in a GDR Foreign Ministry statement issued the same day, both reported by ADN. The latter statement describes the FRG's attempts to keep the GDR out of WHO as "an intolerable burden for the Kassel talks," adding that "whoever makes troubles in Geneva also makes troubles for the preparations for the planned meeting of the heads of governments of the FRG and the GDR in Kassel." The statement labels the FRG's memorandum to WHO "discriminatory, hostile interference" in GDR affairs and a violation of international law representing a relapse "into the possible time of the cold war." The GDR "rejects with the utmost determination" the FRG's "arrogation" of the right to represent the GDR in international affairs and calls the FRG memorandum a "crass contradiction" of Brandt's first government statement in October 1969.

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USSR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

NEW TREATY INCORPORATES LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE

The new Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance signed in Prague on 6 May, as released in full by TASS the same day, incorporates Moscow's ex post facto rationale for the invasion of Czechoslovakia in a clause--the first of its kind to appear in a Soviet treaty with an East European ally--binding the signatories to undertake "the necessary measures to defend the socialist gains" of the two countries. The preamble reinforces the thrust of this proviso in terming the protection of socialist gains "a common internationalist duty of socialist countries" -- the now standard formula advanced in the Bratislava Declaration of 3 August 1968, imposed on Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Five shortly before the invasion. The Bratislava statement declared "support, consolidation, and protection" of socialist gains to be "a common internationalist duty of all socialist countries." Czechoslovakia's vassal status is underscored in the new treaty by a provision, without precedent in such a document, for expansion of "direct ties between bodies of state power and the public organizations of working people of the two countries."

Brezhnev highlighted the treaty's inclusion of the limited sovereignty doctrine in his Prague Castle speech at the signing, noting, according to the Moscow domestic service text, that the pact expresses both countries' "firm will to take all measures necessary to defend the socialist gains" of the two peoples. He warned in the same context: "May our foes never forget that any attempts to violate the territorial integrity of socialist Czechoslovakia will meet with an effective, powerful rebuff from our joint forces." These remarks are featured in the 10 May PRAVDA editorial on the new treaty.

The Prague trade union daily PRACE on 7 May promptly defended the incorporation of the provision on protection of socialist gains, citing as its forerunner not the Bratislava Declaration but "the appropriate conclusions" drawn by the June 1969 international party conference in Moscow. Predicting that the new treaty clause would "be the object of the strongest clamor of enemy propaganda," the paper proceeded to rebut such "clamor" in advance with the stereotyped rationale about socialist states having the "duty" to assist any of their number whose "workers' class is unable to overcome the attack of the enemy forces on its own." Articles by RUDE PRAVO's chief editor and in Bratislava PRAVDA on the 12th, reviewed by CTK, are more forthright in rebutting Western talk about "limited sovereignty" and in citing the Bratislava Declaration as the antecedent of the statement in the preamble on protection of socialist gains.

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DELETION OF "IN EUROPE" PHRASE FOLLOWS TWO PRECEDENTS

Against the background of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the new Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty follows a three-year-old Soviet practice in the renewal of such pacts by deleting the phrase "in Europe" from an article binding each contracting party to come to the other's aid in the event of an attack.

The preamble states that the new treaty takes into account "the present situation" in the two countries' relations as well as changes in Europe "and in the whole world" since the original Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty was concluded on 12 December 1943. The renewal of that 20-year pact had been accomplished merely by a protocol, signed 27 November 1963, which updated the 1943 text by referring to peaceful coexistence and to the Warsaw Treaty of 14 May 1955. The latter document provides for mutual assistance "in the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or several states participating in the Treaty, by any state or group of states" An "in Europe" clause comparable to the one in the Warsaw Treaty was incorporated in the USSR's new bilateral 20-year treaty with East Germany, signed 12 June 1964. The new Soviet treaty with Poland, signed 8 April 1965, altered the formula to specify an attack by West Germany "or any other state which would enter into an alliance" with that country.

Geographical confines were removed entirely from the formula in the new USSR-Bulgarian pact of 12 May 1967 and the new USSR-Hungarian pact of 7 September 1967, both of which refer simply to "an armed attack by any state or group of states." The new treaty with Czechoslovakia follows suit. Moscow's demand for such an open-ended commitment from its treaty partners may be assumed to be one factor underlying the absence of an announced renewal of the Soviet-Romanian 20-year treaty, which expired on 4 February 1968 and remains in force under an automatic five-year extension clause.

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ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

PCI USES LENIN CENTENARY TO REASSERT AUTONOMOUS STANCE

Italian Communist Party (PCI) spokesmen have used the Lenin centenary celebrations in Rome and Moscow to reassert the party's thesis of "national" paths to socialism. An extraordinary session of the PCI Central Committee and Central Control Commission on Lenin Day in Rome was marked by an indirect exchange on the issue between CPSU Central Committee member and Deputy Chairman of the USSR Academy of Sciences A.N. Rumyantsev and PCI Politburo member Giorgio Napolitano. At the Moscow celebrations, PCI Politburo member Gian Carlo Pajetta argued the need for communists to give prime consideration to specific national conditions in formulating their strategy. Napolitano's and Pajetta's remarks were in keeping with PCI efforts since last October to use the Lenin centenary as a peg for exposition of the party's heterodox views: Articles in the PCI press invoked Lenin's teachings to justify the espousal of diverse roads to socialism and counterposed Leninism to Stalinism, going so far as suggest that the CPSU is still organized along Stalinist lines while the PCI is a truly Leninist party.*

POLEMIC Rumyantsev's remarks in Rome on 22 April, summarized by IN ROME the PCI organ L'UNITA on the 23d, seemed contrived as an oblique rebuke to the PCI for failure to take due account of the Soviet revolutionary "model." He described the Soviet revolutionary experience as something that "no people can rail to consider"; and while granting the relevance of national conditions, he stated that "many general laws" which have universal validity are applicable to the process of building socialism. He also contended that the closer a country comes to launching a socialist revolution, "the more precious, actual, and important for them become the experience and conclusions drawn by those who have already gone through that stage of political and socialist development."

In an indirect rejoinder, Napolitano affirmed that the PCI was able to hew to Leninist concepts "without withdrawing into an absurd obedience to a rigid and unchangeable model" which would have been "contrary" to Lenin's teachings. His party, he said, had always placed stress on "a diversity of conditions and historical experiences which must be recognized openly and on a variety of paths of access to socialism and of building socialism." While conceding that the "historical context" was different, he cited as relevant today a statement by Lenin that "socialism is inconceivable without democracy." He pointedly credited the 20th CPSU Congress with providing a great impetus to the PCI's development of "an original prospect of advance toward socialism" and at a later point deplored Stalin's "deforming and opportunist" simplification of Lenin's thinking.

^{*} For a discussion of some of these articles, see the FBIS SURVEY of 12 March 1970, pages 4-9.

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The Rumyantsev-Napolitano exchange had been foreshadowed in a discussion of the Leninist concept of the state at a Soviet-Italian historical meeting in Florence in mid-April. According to a 15 April account of the meeting in L'UNITA, Italian and Soviet scholars registered "differences of interpretation" on the concept of socialist democracy. PCI Central Committee member Luciano Gruppi's remarks, as cited in this account, seemed a transparent criticism of the Soviet model of socialism: the soviets which were supposed to be a government of the workers, he said, "were in fact a government for the workers exercised by the vanguards," and the "bureaucracy" which arose after the Bolshevik revolution was "wedded to 'Great Russian' chauvinism," causing Lenin to be concerned that "the rights of nations to separation should not be a formal one but real." Perhaps with Czechoslovakia in mind, Gruppi concluded that "internationalism can only be the result of the unity of the workers, which can only be achieved when national claims have been satisfied."

Speaking at the Moscow ceremonies on 22 April Pajetta OBSERVANCE was considerably more circumspect than Napolit no vas IN MOSCOW in Rome in pressing for distinctively national roads to socialism. He did argue that for the PCI being Leninist means giving prime emphasis to "securing a profound connection between the party and the reality of one's country," and he invoked Lenin's authority in noting the party's rejection of "the schematism of those who have tried to turn Marxist teaching from an instrument for recognizing reality . . . into a dogma." Pajetta cited among factors contributing to Lenin's stature among revolutionaries his insistence on careful analysis "of the special conditions of each separate country and each separate historical period." He concluded that "Leninist internationalism" entails firm backing for "the self-dependence of every party, regard for a given country's particular features, and the independence of every country."

BACKGROUND PCI leaders on past occasions have been explicit in rejecting Italian communist emulation of Soviet experience. PCI Secretariat member Paolo Bufalini, for example, writing in the 17 April issue of the PCI theoretical journal RINASCITA on a 1951 clash between Stalin and Togliatti, declared:

We are struggling for the democratic and socialist renovation of Italy on a path and perspective which are profoundly different than those of the USSR and other socialist countries. We are struggling to arrive at socialism by a democratic path, to arrive at a pluralistic socialist society. History cannot be repeated

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The PCI has persistently and directly censured Moscow for ignoring the question of democratization of Soviet society. For example, a 14 April L'UNITA article by the paper's Moscow correspondent, after discussing recent debates in the USSR on economic reform, observed: "What has been lacking up to now, at least in the public debate, . . . is a speech which would broaden the debates to include problems of a more specifically political nature, taking up, for example, the study of the reasons which actually limited the debate at the 20th CPSU congress to a mere denunciation of the errors of Stalin without tackling the problems of the structure and expansion of socialist democracy."

STRESS ON PARTY AUTONOMY SERVES DOMESTIC POLITICAL ENDS

Emphasis by PCI spokesmen on the party's complete autonomy has seemed calculated in considerable measure to bolster the party's domestic political position, with regional elections slated for 7 June. Frequently citing the PCI's opposition to the invasion of Czechoslovakia as proof of its independence, party spokesmen have on occasion contrasted this position with the alleged subservience of center-left Italian parties to U.S. dictates. PCI Deputy General Secretary Berlinguer on 21 April contended that "no other Italian party has given more proof of its independence than the PCI" and concluded, recalling the party's opposition to the August 1968 intervention, that the Czechoslovak events had afforded "new reasons" to justify PCI opposition to the division of Europe into rival military blocs which "severely limit the independence and free development of every country."

Berlinguer made it clear in that speech that the PCI's vision of democratic socialism had nothing in common with the socialism practiced in Eastern Europe. "We intend," he said, "to follow the path of a novel and modern socialism, one which is not bureaucratic, one which is based on the protection and exaltation of all individual and collective liberties," with "the concurrence of a plurality of political forces."

In a 3 May speech condemning the U.S. intervention in Cambodia, Berlinguer scored the Italian ruling parties' "timid silence" on the issue while highlighting the PCI's "autonomous positions" on problems affecting socialist countries. PCI spokesmen have used much the same approach in arguing for a severance of Italian ties with NATO. Thus a L'UNITA article on 15 April, recalling the PCI's firm opposition to "limited sovereignty" in any form and most recently in Czechoslovakia, went on to ask rhetorically "who among the men of the noncommunist left" were prepared to take a comparable position "in the face of the 'limited sovereignty' imposed on the Italian state by Atlantic military integration."

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MAY DAY PHOTOGRAPHS REFLECT RANKINGS OF SOVIET LEADERS

Comparison of May Day photos of Soviet leaders with the last photographic lineups published in the central press late last year (7, 8, and 26 November, 7 and 17 December) suggests some shifts in the fortunes of junior Politburo members. Polyanskiy, most frequently ranked sixth in late 1969, has now slipped below Pelshe and Mazurov. Pelshe has risen to No. 6 -- his highest ranking since Joining the Politburo. Pelshe's status in the past has been unclear; for example, PRAVDA's 8 November 1969 photo showed him in seventh place while all the other central papers showed him last. Voronov is again shown standing last, as in PRAVDA's 7 December picture.

The May Day standings appear to set the six older men--from the 71-yearold Pelshe to the 64-year-old Brezhnev and Kirilenko--apart from the four younger men. Those in the younger group, from the 60-yearold Voronov to the 52-year-old Shelepin, are relegated to the lower positions.

There is a more marked change in the Ukrainian press rankings of Moscow Politburo members. The lineup of portraits published in the 2 May Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAINA strikingly favors Shelepin, placing him far higher than in Moscow's lineup and far higher than the Ukrainians had been ranking him:

Moscow Press	<u>Ukrainian Press</u>
Brezhnev Kosygin Podgornyy	Brezhnev Kosygin Podgornyy
Suslov Kirilenko Pelshe	Kirilenko Suslov
[Shelest not present] Mazurov	Shelepin Shelest Mazurov
Polyanskiy Shelepin Voronov	Voronov Polyanskiy Pelshe

Shelepin has consistently ranked next to last, No. 10, for the last two years in the Ukraine. He had been favored briefly in late 1967-raised to No. 6 in the 8 November and 25 December 1967 RADYANSKA UKRAINA-but dropped back to tenth place on May Day 1968 and subsequently.

Since late 1967 the Ukrainians have consistently ranked Suslov below Kirilenko and have consistently listed Mazurov, Voronov, and Polyanskiy in that order. The Ukrainians always rank their leader, Shelest, No. 7 and Pelshe last. Suslov and Polyanskiy are always less favored

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INFIGHTING CONTINUES IN UKRAINIAN WRITERS UNION

Recent reports in the Ukrainian literary press indicate continuing turmoil in the Ukrainian Writers Union and complicated maneuvering among its feuding moderate and conservative leaders. There is evidence that after setbacks suffered in late 1969 and early 1970, the moderates have won a few rounds themselves.

Last December the moderates lost ground when conservatives engineered the expulsion of dissident writer Ivan Dzyuba from the Writers Union as well as the removal of Marharita Malinovska, a defender of Writers Union Chairman Oles Honchar's novel "Sobor," from her post as deputy editor of the main Ukrainian Literary newspaper, LITERATURNA UKRAINA. Although Honchar's first deputy, conservative Yuriy Zbanatskiy, now appears to be playing a bigger role, especially in organizational work, the moderate Honchar is himself still very much in evidence. In April Honchar took advantage of the Lenin birth centenary celebrations to call again for a tolerant policy toward writers' creative work. Also in late April, one of Honchar's leading critics and the initiator of public attacks on Dzyuba, Oleksiy Poltoratskiy, was forced to make a public confession that his own work lacked ideological demandingness.

VICTORIES FOR CONSERVATIVES

Although Ivan Dzyuba's openly anti-Russian book "Internationalism or Russification?" was published in the West in 1968, the Ukrainian Writers Union

failed to take any action against him. Writers Union chairman Oles Honchar failed to criticize Dzyuba or to participate in action against other Ukrainian dissidents. The attacks on the signers of Ukrainian protect petitions circulating in early 1968 were made by Vasyl Kozachenko, Ukrainian Writers Union secretary and Kiev writers' party committee secretary (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 21 and 24 May 1968), and VSESVIT editor Oleksiy Poltoratskiy (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 16 July 1968).

At a December 1968 meeting of Kozachenko's Kiev writers' party organization, Poltoratskiy initiated the attack on Dzyuba and also criticized the defenders of Honchar's novel "Sobor" (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 27 December 1968). For many months Poltoratskiy remained the only one on record publicly attacking Dzyuba's book.

Finally, in late 1969, the conservatives moved against Dzyuba without the cooperation of Writers Union Chairman Honchar. The Kiev writers organization board, of which Kozachenko is chairman, expelled Dzyuba from the Writers Union. In late December 1969 the presidium of the Ukrainian Writers Union met to consider confirmation of Dzyuba's expulsion. The meeting was conducted by Kozachenko and conservative Writers Union first Deputy Chairman Yuriy Zbanatskiy, with Chairman Honchar not participating. After obtaining a partial recantation

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from Dzyuba, the presidium decided to allow him to remain in the union if he changed his ways (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 6 January 1970).

Dzyuba was again admonished at a 15 January 1970 Writers Union board plenum, where keynoter Pavlo Zahrebelnyy complained of the "many unpleasantnesses" Dzyuba had caused the union by his speeches and book (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 16 January 1970). Belated attempts were undertaken by the Ukraine's foreign propaganda organ, the Society for Cultural Ties With Ukrainians Abroad, to counteract the damage done by Dzyuba's book. At a 12 February meeting the society's chairman, Yuriy Smolich, announced that the society had published a book by Bohdan Stanchuk to refute Dzyuba's book (VISTI Z UKRAINI, 19 February 1970). It was also published in English under the title "What I. Dzyuba Stands For, and How He Does It" and was described in the society's English-language paper NEWS FROM UKRAINE, No. 4, February 1970.

Moderates received another blow at the beginning of January with the removal of LITERATURNA UKRAINA's deputy editor Marharita Malinovska. Malinovska had been the first to laud Honchar's "Sobor" when it was published in January 1968; her review appeared on the 19th of that month in LITERATURNA UKRAINA, and in RADYANSKA UKRAINA of 26 April 1968 she was attacked by M. Yurchuk and F. Lebedenko for praising "Sobor" even before the novel had reached the reader.

Signs of trouble in LITERATURNA UKRAINA's editorial board had first appeared in October 1969. On 21 October chief editor I. Zub's name was removed from the list of editorial board members, and Malinovska's name was moved up to head of the board, although she was still listed only as deputy editor. On 21 November LITERATURNA UKRAINA carried an account of a meeting of Kozachenko's Kiev writers' party organization at which LITERATURNA UKRAINA was criticized for publishing material which "lacks ideological sharpness and party principledness." The same issue listed Zub again as chief editor, after a month with no chief editor listed. A few days later Malinovska lost her title of deputy editor and from 5 December on was simply another editorial board member. A month later—in the same 6 January 1970 issue which announced the expulsion of Dzyuba and his recantation—Malinovska was dropped from the editorial board altogether.

Four days later the Ukrainian Central Committee organ RADYANSKA UKRAINA carried writer Boris Buryak's criticism of LITERATURNA UKRAINA for "praising clear artistic failures" and not reflecting the "tastes of readers and the writers' organization." In March the Writers Union

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party committee discussed LITERATURNA UKRAINA's work and took it to task for not criticizing recent literary works of V. Drozd, R. Ivanichuk and I. Chendey.* LITERATURNA UKRAINA was warned to raise its ideological demandingness and was admonished that "Lenin was implacable to what he called 'literary disguising' of antisocialist ideas . . ." (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 13 March 1970).

GAINS SCORED Honchar and the moderates appear to be holding their BY MODERATES own. In January a defender of Honchar's novel became chief of the Writers Union book advertising; in April Honchar made a speech urging a policy of toleration in literary work; and at the end of April Honchar critic and hardliner Poltoratskiy was publicly humiliated for himself publishing ideologically objectionable material.

At a meeting of the presidium of the Writers Union on 20 January 1970 Vitaliy Petlyovanyy resigned as director of the Writers Union literary advertising bureau for reasons of health, and V. Pyanov replaced him (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 23 January). Conservative Petlyovanyy had generally concurred in criticisms of "Sobor," in LITERATURNA UKRAINA on 27 December 1968), while Pyanov had highly praised "Sobor" in the 22 February 1968 ROBITNICHA HAZETA. After a 26 April 1968 article in the Central Committee organ RADYANSKA UKRAINA had attacked "Sobor" and Pyanov's review, ROBITNICHA HAZETA admitted on 28 April that Pyanov's article had been a "mistake."

HONCHAR APPEAL Speaking on behalf of the Writers Union at a 9 April FOR TOLERATION 1970 joint plenum of Ukrainian creative unions on Lenin's 100th anniversary, Honchar delivered a strong appeal for tolerance and nonintervention in literary life. Noting the frequent rebukes to young authors, he declared that no one has exact answers for all new phenomena and "life cannot be laid in a Procrustean bed of dogmatism." He stated that it is in the interests of foreign eneries to have Soviet literature appear dry, dogmatic, and schematic and for Soviet literature to "lose the readers' faith." The party "orients us to create highly-talented literature" which can win the reader "by the strength of artistic images," he said, quoting Lenin to the effect that talent must be carefully protected. While "we must accept readers' demandingness without irritation," he admonished, the "readers must also be taught deeper understanding of the specific features of literary and, in general, artistic work," since, for example, "among the youth some have superficial bourgeois ideas about the hard

^{*} Ivanichuk's "Malva" was attacked in the 7 February 1970 PRAVDA UKRAINY by N. Ravluk. A historical novel about the 1600's, it allegedly failed to contain characters with a positive attitude toward Russia. One of Chendey's works was attacked in the 7 September MOLOD UKRAINY for presenting religion in a positive light.

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work of creative intelligentsia." People can be educated "only by truth," he declared, and "the time of vulgar criticism has passed, and unfounded critical willfulness is an unpopular thing now."

Honchar also appeared to aim a jibe at russified oblasts like Dnepropetrovsk, where Ukrainian literature is sometimes discriminated against. He declared that Ukrainian literature enjoys wide popularity outside the Ukraine and is honored everywhere—"which, unfortunately, cannot be said about some of the oblasts of our own republic, where carelessness stubbornly shows itself, say, in the fitting out of children's, school and factory libraries." Dnepropetrovsk officials led the persecution of Honchar's "Sobor," and according to a purported April 1969 letter from a Ukrainian citizen published in the October 1969 emigre journal SUCHASNIST, there is a ban on "Sobor" in Dnepropetrovsk oblast.

In another instance of Dnepropetrovsk leaders' support of a hard line, Dnepropetrovsk City First Secretary A. A. Ulanov, a foe of Honchar,* wrote an article published 12 March 1970 in Moscow's SOVIET CULTURE defending interference in art and telling of a new crackdown on Dnepropetrovsk theaters.

That Honchar's views enjoy a measure of party support seems apparent from the publication of his long speech not only in LITERATURNA UKRAINA but also-fully-in the Ukrainian Central Committee organ RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 10 April 1970.

HONCHAR CRITIC Moderates apparently could take some satisfaction
UNDER ATTACK from the misfortune of one of their most outspoken
critics, Oleksiy Poltoratskiy, who was subjected
to criticism by fellow-conservatives. On 24 April a meeting of the
Writers Union board presidium was held to discuss the work of the
journal VSESVIT, which publishes foreign literature in Ukrainian.
A meeting of the Writers Union party committee shortly before had
made "serious criticisms" of the work of chief editor Poltoratskiy
and of the journal's party organization and editorial collegium.

Zbanatskiy, who delivered the 24 April report, berated VSESVIT for printing works of "second-rate foreign writers" and works "of doubtful value by adherents of modernistic trends," as well as novels and stories of "low ideological-artistic quality." Its

^{*} See his 4 June 1968 SOVIET CULTURE attack on Honchar and "Sobor."

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poetry selections were "even worse," and its political articles "lack aggressiveness" (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 28 April 1970). Poltoratskiy acknowledged the criticism as "correct and timely." Writers Union party committee secretary Yakiv Bash called for more interference in the work of VSESVIT by the journal's party organization as well as by the Writers Union leadership. Four members of VSESVIT's editorial board accused Poltoratskiy of running the journal singlehandedly. Even conservative Kozachenko criticized Poltoratskiy's "mistakes" and "loss of a high sense of demandingness."

Although there was no indication that Poltoratskiy would lose his post, the notably severe treatment of him personally suggests that he was the victim of infighting. VSESVIT had been criticized in the past for poor ideological standards in choosing works for publication -- an occupational hazard in a journal reprinting noncommunist literature. But the present criticism is more serious. It appears to stem from the January 1970 Writers Union board plenum on "international ties of Ukrainian literature." Plenum keynoter Zahrebelnyy, who has himself been attacked by conservatives in the past, noted VSESVIT's popularity and its many awards but criticized its "mistakes and its "inconsistent" attitude toward representatives of "bourgeois modernism" (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 16 January 1970). At the plenum, Poltoratskiy defended his choice of foreign works presented in his journal -- noting, for example, that in mid-1968 "we were reproached" for publishing Remarque, yet soon afterward PRAVDA itself described Remarque as a "talented antifascist writer" (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 20 January).

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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

REBUILDING OF PARTY STRUCTURE CONTINUES AT CAUTIOUS PACE

PRC central and provincial radio reports suggest that the year-long campaign to rebuild the Chinese Communist Party into a disciplined organizational structure continues to make slight progress at the county level. While central press editorials and RED FLAG articles have clearly asserted the authority of rebuilt party committees over established revolutionary committees, as well as the need to set party members apart from the masses, implementation has apparently been slowed by misunderstandings at the local level.

A 19 April NCNA report which has recently become available cited a Harbin factory as a model for restoring party authority. The report criticized members of mass organizations, including members of the Young Communist League (YCL), who act only "on Chairman Mao's teachings and the instructions of the party Central Committee" and do not comply with the decisions of the local party branch. The party branch in the factory, the report said, organized study classes which taught that the party's authority, inspired by Mao's thought and leadership, "is carried out through party organizations" and that "we must obey the correct leadership of the party branch." To aid the party branch in avoiding "doing whatever the masses want to do," which "harms the cause of the revolution," NCNA said the masses should be limited to regular meetings with party members once every two weeks.

Provincial reports reflect central concern for establishing the correct relationship between party units and mass organizations, while claiming that some progress is being made. On 9 May Harbin radio reported that Wangkuei and Ningan counties had established new party committees; Heilungkiang had previously reported a countylevel committee for Hulin county as well as one for the Hulin YCL. An article written by the Wangkuei party committee, arguing forcefully for improvement of the party's organizational discipline, claimed that in the rebuilding process it was necessary to criticize the incorrect idea that "rebels win merits and have a chance to be admitted to the party" and that "whoever takes part in the threein-one combination should join the party." It added that standards for party membership should not be lowered and that activists applying for party membership should be judged according to the party constitution to insure "the fine quality of party members." All mass organizations must accept the concept that the party leadership is superior "and must be respected by everybody," it concluded.

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Hangchow radio on 7 and 9 May mentioned new party committees for Lanchi and Teching counties; Chekiang had previously reported no new party units at the county level. After more than a year of party building efforts, only Hunan, Heilungkiang, Kansu, Anhwei, Hupeh, Chekiang and Kwangtung have now claimed one or more reconstructed county-level party committees. Only Kwangtung has rebuilt a city-level committee.

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